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BEYOND POLICE CONDUCT: ANALYZING VOLUNTARY 
CONSENT TO WARRANTLESS SEARCHES BY THE MENTALLY 
ILL AND DISABLED 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is 10 a.m. on a Tuesday, and police detectives are looking for David, a 
possible suspect in an armed robbery that took place the previous evening.  
Although they have some evidence from witnesses indicating that David may 
have been involved in the robbery, the detectives are not certain about the 
extent of his involvement.  They do not have enough information to make out 
probable cause for an arrest or search warrant.  The detectives arrive at the 
home David shares with his mother, Joanne.  She informs them that David is at 
work but will probably be home in the afternoon and that, in any event, he is 
never late for dinner, which is always at 6 p.m.  The detectives ask Joanne if 
they can look around in the house, and she agrees.  After about forty-five 
minutes, while looking around in the basement, one of the detectives finds a 
pistol, a ski mask, and wad of bills inside a brown paper bag that had been 
stuffed behind the washing machine.  Armed with this new and highly 
incriminating evidence, the detectives obtain a warrant and subsequently arrest 
David at work.  With the evidence seized, he is easily convicted or convinced 
to plead guilty. 
The preceding scenario plays out, with some variations, hundreds if not 
thousands of times a day across the United States.  Searches conducted 
pursuant to consent make up virtually all warrantless searches.1  The police 
strongly prefer obtaining consent to search rather than a search warrant 
because it is faster, involves less paperwork, is less likely to result in evidence 
being suppressed, and generally requires using fewer resources.2 
Add some new facts to the everyday situation described above: Joanne is 
mentally disabled, and David’s sister Evelyn is her court-appointed guardian.  
Joanne has received disability payments from the Social Security 
 
 1. Rebecca Strauss, Note, We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard Way: The Use of 
Deceit to Induce Consent Searches, 100 MICH. L. REV. 868, 871 (2002). 
 2. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 4 (1990); David S. Kaplan & Lisa Dixon, 
Coerced Waiver and Coerced Consent, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 941, 948 (1997). 
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Administration for her entire adult life.3  Suddenly, a motion to suppress the 
pistol, mask, and money looks a lot more viable.4  A similar issue arises in this 
not-too-farfetched scenario: Responding to a noise complaint, police officers 
knock on the door of an apartment.  John answers and quickly accedes to their 
request to come in.  In the living room, in plain view, are several weapons and 
explosive devices.  After his arrest, John is examined by psychiatrists who 
learn that he was stockpiling the weapons in preparation for Armageddon, and 
thought the police were fellow warriors who had come to deliver his 
instructions for the Last Battle.  Could John and Joanne have validly consented 
to the searches conducted in the two hypotheticals?  How should a court go 
about deciding? 
Courts that have considered fact patterns similar to the two above have 
come down on both sides of the question.  That is not surprising in and of itself 
because these are close, fact-sensitive questions.5  What is surprising is the 
lack of consistency in courts’ reasoning.  The Supreme Court laid down the 
definitive standard for determining voluntary consent to warrantless searches 
three decades ago in the landmark case of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.6  Since 
that time, however, it has become clear that courts have a difficult time 
applying the standard to cases involving mentally disabled or mentally ill 
people. 
This Note proposes a new test for courts faced with the issue of consent to 
a warrantless search obtained from a mentally ill or disabled person.  Part II 
will trace the historical evolution of the Supreme Court’s definition of 
“voluntary,” in both the consent and confession contexts, and will show how 
the Schneckloth standard has been modified over time.  Part III will examine 
 
 3. The factual scenario described is based on a homicide case prosecuted in Missouri in 
2003.  The motion to suppress evidence was denied, and the defendant in that case was ultimately 
convicted of second-degree murder. 
 4. At the end of 2000, almost a million people in the criminal justice system suffered from 
some form of mental illness.  Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Fact Sheet #3: Individuals 
with Mental Illnesses in Jail and Prison, at http://www.bazelon.org/issues/criminalization/ 
factsheets/criminal3.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2003).  One in six jail inmates has a mental 
illness, and approximately two-thirds of these suffer from a severe mental illness.  Id.  According 
to some estimates, approximately one in ten maximum-security and death row inmates 
nationwide have mental retardation.  Caroline Everington & Solomon M. Fulero, Competence to 
Confess: Measuring Understanding and Suggestibility of Defendants with Mental Retardation, 37 
MENTAL RETARDATION 212, 212 (1999).  Altogether, between 45,000 and 200,000 mentally 
retarded individuals may be currently imprisoned in the United States.  Morgan Cloud et al., 
Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 495, 504 (2002). 
 5. See Kaplan & Dixon, supra note 2, at 948.  These factual questions, however, nearly 
always come out in favor of the prosecution.  Id.  The question often becomes a credibility contest 
between the police officer and an accused with a strong motive to fabricate.  Id. 
 6. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).  The standard is one of voluntariness under the totality of the 
circumstances, which will be explained more completely in Part II, infra. 
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how federal and state courts have applied the standard to cases involving 
mentally ill or disabled people over the last three decades.  Part IV will 
examine social science literature showing the tendency of people in general to 
follow directions and suggestions from authority figures, and the tendency of 
mentally impaired people in particular to respond in the affirmative to 
questions as a default response.  Part V will show that courts’ emphasis on 
coercive police tactics is inadequate to assess the voluntariness of consent 
given by individuals with particular vulnerabilities.  Drawing lessons from the 
social science literature, some of the more carefully reasoned opinions seen in 
Part III, and other cases that have dealt with similar issues, Part VI will 
propose a new test to deal with consent to search obtained from mentally 
impaired individuals in a thorough, consistent, and fundamentally fair fashion, 
in the process recapturing the original spirit of Schneckloth.  In essence, courts 
should look beyond both the conduct of police in requesting consent and the 
officers’ perception of whether the person was mentally able to consent and 
focus instead on the narrower factual question of whether the person was 
capable of voluntary consent.  “[E]venhanded law enforcement is best 
achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than 
standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer.”7 
II.  SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON CONSENT 
Searches and seizures are governed by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.8  The amendment prohibits “unreasonable” searches and seizures 
and also specifies criteria for issuing valid search warrants.9  Thus, searches 
and seizures performed without a valid warrant are per se unreasonable, 
although that rule has some specific exceptions.10  Over the years, the Supreme 
Court has recognized several exceptions to the warrant requirement, including: 
investigatory detentions; searches incident to a lawful arrest; inventory 
searches; border searches; a variety of exigent circumstances; special rules for 
searching vehicles and containers without a warrant; administrative searches; 
and searches conducted pursuant to voluntary consent.11 
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court was not called upon to define “voluntary” 
in the consent search context until Schneckloth in 1973.  With little compelling 
precedent in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to guide its analysis, the Court 
turned first to how it had defined “voluntary” in terms of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of due process and how that had been applied to 
 
 7. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990). 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
 11. See generally Michael A. Borucke et al., Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 77 GEO. 
L.J. 517 (1989). 
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confessions.12  Noting that the definition and application of voluntariness had 
proved ambiguous over the years, Justice Potter Stewart, writing for the 
majority, said that voluntariness is essentially a balancing test between “the 
acknowledged need for police questioning as a tool for the effective 
enforcement of criminal laws,” and society’s belief that unfair police tactics 
threaten our notion of justice.13  Voluntariness in the due process context had 
traditionally been defined as requiring a weighing of “the totality of all the 
circumstances,” including any coercive police tactics and the personal 
characteristics of the accused.14 
The opinion would have been wholly unremarkable had the Court not 
seriously called the due process voluntariness test into question just a few 
years before in the famous case of Miranda v. Arizona.15  In Miranda, the 
Court noted that the due process voluntariness standard had generated much 
“‘confusion’” and “‘misconception’” in its application.16  To create a clear, 
simple, bright-line test to avoid such confusion and misconception, the Court 
rejected the due process standard and held that individuals being interrogated 
in police custody must be given explicit warnings of their right to remain silent 
and to be represented by counsel before making any statements to the police.17  
A suspect could still make a confession to the police, but he must first 
knowingly and intelligently waive those rights about which he had been 
specifically apprised.18 
With the seven-year-old precedent of Miranda looming large, the 
Schneckloth Court had to explain its reliance on the due process voluntariness 
test in the search and seizure context and distinguish it from the confession 
context.19  The Court asserted that when police seek consent to search, it is 
often out in the field under informal circumstances, which would make giving 
an effective warning impractical.20  While considering it a closer call, the 
Court decided that seeking consent to search in such situations was 
“immeasurably, far removed” from the custodial interrogation situations that 
 
 12. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973). 
 13. Id. at 224-25. 
 14. Id. at 227.  Later in the opinion, the Court was clearly concerned with more than obvious 
incidents of police brutality.  The Court noted that “account must be taken of subtly coercive 
police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents.”  
Id. at 229. 
 15. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 16. Id. at 461-62 (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 549 (1897)). 
 17. Id. at 467-69. 
 18. Id. at 475. 
 19. Although only seven years had passed, a significant turnover had occurred on the Court 
in those intervening years.  Chief Justice Warren was succeeded by Chief Justice Burger.  Justices 
Fortas, Harlan, Clark, and Black were succeeded by Justices Rehnquist, Marshall, Powell, and 
Blackmun. 
 20. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231 (1973). 
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had concerned the Miranda Court.21  Further, the Court noted that Miranda 
itself had already made the distinction, expressly excluding from its holding 
traditional police work such as seeking evidence in the field and on-the-scene 
questioning of people who had not been taken into custody.22 
With that distinction made, Justice Stewart23 eschewed a warning 
requirement for consent searches, saying that “knowledge of the right to refuse 
consent is [not] a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a ‘voluntary’ 
consent.”24  The Court also refused to adopt the “waiver” doctrine that had 
been applied in Miranda—that in order to consent to a search, a person must 
knowingly and intelligently waive his or her right to be free from unreasonable 
police searches.25  Grafting such a requirement onto the Fourth Amendment 
would be both unwieldy and a break from constitutional tradition because 
knowing and intelligent waiver had been almost exclusively applied to trial 
rights, and had been determined in formal hearings before a judge, not by 
police in the field.26 
Schneckloth’s adoption of the due process totality of the circumstances test 
for determining the voluntariness of a consent to search has been modified by 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions in two ways.  First, although Schneckloth 
propounded a test for inquiring whether consent had in fact been given,27 it is 
now clear that objective reasonableness is the standard.  That is, would 
reasonable police officers have thought that the person was consenting under 
the circumstances?  In Florida v. Jimeno,28 the Supreme Court expressly 
adopted such a reasonableness standard in deciding the scope of a person’s 
consent to a search.29  The Court held that “it was objectively reasonable for 
the police to conclude that the general consent to search respondents’ car 
included consent to search containers within that car.”30  Although this 
 
 21. Id. at 232. 
 22. Id. 
 23. One of the four holdovers, Stewart had joined the dissent in Miranda.  Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 504. 
 24. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 232-33. 
 25. Id. at 235-46. 
 26. Id. at 241-42.  The applicability of knowing and intelligent waiver to the Fourth 
Amendment will be discussed more thoroughly in Part V, infra, during examination of Justice 
Marshall’s dissenting opinion. 
 27. Id. at 227.  The court makes repeated reference throughout the opinion to whether a 
consent was “in fact” voluntary, reinforcing that, at the time of the decision, that was the 
prevailing standard.  E.g., id. at 218, 221, 223, 227, 229, 248. 
 28. 500 U.S. 248 (1991). 
 29. Id. at 251.  “The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the 
Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable 
person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”  Id. 
 30. Id. 
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reasonableness standard has not yet been broadly applied by the Court to all 
instances of consent, it requires no stretch of the imagination.31 
Second, where Schneckloth made specific mention of the consenting 
person’s age, education, and intelligence as factors to consider in the totality of 
the circumstances analysis,32 the subsequent case of Colorado v. Connelly33 
raises serious doubts about whether a court would find a consent to search 
involuntary absent some form of police misconduct.34  In Connelly, the Court 
considered a claim by a schizophrenic and hallucinatory defendant that his 
mental impairment had made it impossible for him to voluntarily waive his 
Miranda rights and make an incriminating statement to the police.35  The Court 
specifically repudiated the Colorado Supreme Court’s holding that a severe 
mental illness, even without police pressure, could cause a person’s confession 
to be involuntarily made: 
Absent police conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no 
basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of 
due process of law. . . . [Even the presence of subtle psychological persuasion] 
does not justify a conclusion that a defendant’s mental condition, by itself and 
apart from its relation to official coercion, should ever dispose of the inquiry 
into constitutional “voluntariness.”36 
Although that holding has never been applied by the Supreme Court to the 
consent search context, because the voluntariness standard applies, the 
implication is clear that courts assessing consent searches should make a 
factual finding of coercive police activity as a condition precedent to any 
finding of involuntariness.37 
III.  APPLYING THE SCHNECKLOTH STANDARD 
In the thirty years since Schneckloth was decided, courts have rarely been 
called upon38 to apply that standard to cases involving the mentally ill or 
 
 31. The Court has also adopted a broad reasonableness standard in permitting police to 
reasonably rely on a search warrant that is later found invalid, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 922 (1984), and in permitting police to reasonably rely on the apparent authority of a person 
to consent to a search of a dwelling, Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990). 
 32. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. 
 33. 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 161-62. 
 36. Id. at 164. 
 37. At least one prominent commentator has suggested that the Supreme Court might well 
extend Connelly to cover consent searches.  3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.1 
(3d ed. 1996). 
 38. A much greater number of cases deal with the interplay between intoxication and 
consent, an issue outside the scope of this Note.  For some representative decisions in this area, 
see United States v. Dukes, 139 F.3d 469, 472-73 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting claim that Dukes’s 
co-conspirator had been rendered incompetent to voluntarily consent due to chronic drug abuse); 
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disabled.39  The relative infrequency, along with the difficulty of the subject 
matter, have led to varying approaches.  The cases can be loosely organized 
into three groups.  The first, by far the largest, is composed of decisions that 
give cursory treatment to the interplay between voluntary consent and mental 
impairment.  The second is composed of decisions that confuse or conflate the 
voluntariness of consent with other issues.  The third grouping includes 
decisions that provide structured, in-depth analysis of the issue, although with 
occasionally variable results. 
A. Conclusory Treatment 
In United States v. Duran,40 the Seventh Circuit evaluated the 
voluntariness of the consent to search given by a defendant’s wife, who was in 
a fragile emotional state and had failed to take medication for a nervous 
disorder for a week preceding the event.41  The court found her mental state 
significant but, “absent a showing that her emotional distress was so profound 
as to impair her capacity for self-determination,” insufficient to ultimately find 
her consent involuntary.42  The key factor in the court’s holding was that the 
police had given the wife a consent form to sign that explicitly informed her of 
her right to refuse consent.43 
The same court tackled the issue again eight years later in United States v. 
Strache.44  Assessing the voluntariness of a consent to search given by a 
mentally ill and suicidal defendant, the court upheld the search and declined to 
 
United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 377 (10th Cir. 1985) (finding that although Gay was not in an 
ideal condition for making important life decisions, he was “rational enough to understand 
requests and to give plausible explanations”). 
 39. There are many references in the cases below to a defendant’s intelligence quotient, or 
“IQ,” in reference to mental retardation.  Modern medical practice, however, defines a person 
with mental retardation as someone with “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning,” with 
concurrent limitations in performing at least two of a specified group of daily life skills, 
manifesting before the age of 18.  ROBERT J. GREGORY, FOUNDATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL 
ASSESSMENT: THE WAIS-III AND OTHER TESTS IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 141 (1999).  Court 
opinions rarely provide enough factual description to conform with this definition, and usually 
rely on IQ as a substitute.  There are several recognized tests for measuring IQ, but again courts 
rarely specify which was used in a particular case.  For two of the more widely-used tests, the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (WAIS-III) and the Stanford-Binet: Fourth Edition, the 
upper limit of significantly subaverage intellectual function is an IQ of about 75, provided that the 
other clinical measures support a diagnosis of mental retardation.  Id. 
 40. 957 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 41. Id. at 503. 
 42. Id.  The court added that the trial court had erred in not considering the importance of her 
mental state, and said that it was irrelevant whether it had arisen as a result of police conduct.  Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. 202 F.3d 980 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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suppress the evidence seized by police.45  The defendant’s girlfriend had called 
police after he threatened to kill himself; although she managed to get the gun 
away from him, she gave it back after he calmed down.46  The court focused on 
the testimony of police that Strache was calm and cooperative, “appeared to be 
in control of his faculties and understood what was transpiring.”47  The police 
only transferred Strache to a hospital for a mental health evaluation after 
discovering the explosive devices.48  The court gave short shrift to Strache’s 
claim of mental impairment, saying that he “paint[ed] a stark picture of himself 
as a mentally ill and suicidal young man accosted by a phalanx of police 
officers pressuring him into verbal consent.”49  Although Strache was 
handcuffed and had not been advised of his rights at the time his consent to 
search was sought, the court reasoned that any coercion was mitigated because 
it was only for twenty minutes and “the police did not badger him for 
information or consent, nor physically abuse or pressure him.”50 
In United States v. Ross,51 the Fourth Circuit upheld the validity of a search 
conducted pursuant to the consent of a woman who suffered from long-term 
brain damage and a resulting mental condition.52  Psychiatric experts testified 
that Ross was “significantly impaired at the time she gave consent.”53  The trial 
court, while taking notice of the expert testimony, concluded that Ross’s 
impairment was not so great that her consent did not result from a “rational 
intellect” and the exercise of “free will.”54  In affirming the trial court ruling, 
the Fourth Circuit cited as the decisive factor “Ross’[s] demeanor and 
responsiveness,” together with the lack of force or duress.55  The court also 
rejected an argument that the district court had improperly created a rebuttable 
presumption of voluntariness that “required Ross to present evidence that her 
mental impairment was so great that it vitiated her consent.”56  The court 
disagreed, saying that the trial court had properly considered her mental 
condition as a factor in the required totality of the circumstances analysis.57 
 
 45. Id. at 985-86.  The key evidence consisted of several weapons and explosive devices.  Id. 
at 985. 
 46. Id. at 982. 
 47. Id. at 983. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Strache, 202 F.3d at 985. 
 50. Id. at 986. 
 51. No. 91-5151, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1318 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 1992) (per curiam). 
 52. Id. at *8. 
 53. Id. at *6. 
 54. Id. at *7. 
 55. Id. at *9. 
 56. Ross, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1318 at *10. 
 57. Id. 
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In United States v. Habershaw,58 a district judge denied a motion to 
suppress evidence obtained via the consent of a man diagnosed with a variety 
of psychological ailments who was accused of possession of child 
pornography.59  Testimony from a live expert and the report of a second expert 
were presented at the suppression hearing, variously describing Habershaw as 
suffering from Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, a gender identity 
disorder, and an impulse control disorder.60  The testifying expert concluded 
that Habershaw was incapable of giving “informed consent,” and had difficulty 
“understanding the consequences of his actions.”61  The court found this 
evidence unpersuasive in light of Habershaw’s four previous arrests, high 
school special education classes, and the absence of coercion or intimidation.62  
The court noted that Habershaw “may not have fully recognized what might 
happen if he allowed the police to search his computer, [but] this fact alone 
does not render his consent involuntary.”63  Particularly significant was the fact 
that the accused escorted the police around his apartment and actually showed 
them which files to open on his computer.64 
In State v. Osborne,65 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld a 
search where consent was obtained from a defendant who an expert testified 
was in a psychotic state at the time of the consent.66  The court’s entire analysis 
of the mental impairment issue is as follows: 
There may be situations in which, due to psychiatric disorders, drugs or 
intoxication, the defendant’s consent is “not the product of a rational intellect 
and a free will” and is therefore invalid.  “No matter how genuine the belief of 
the officers is that the consenter is apparently of sound mind and deliberately 
acting, the search depending on his consent fails if it is judicially determined 
that he lacked mental capacity.”  The determination of mental capacity to 
consent is a question of fact for the trier of fact, which will not be disturbed if 
it is reasonably supported by the evidence.  At the suppression hearing, Dr. 
Standow, who first examined the defendant several months after the search, 
testified at length about the defendant’s alleged “psychotic state.”  The other 
 
 58. No. 01-10195-PBS, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8977 (D. Mass. May 13, 2002). 
 59. Id. at *2. 
 60. Id. at *19-20.  Some relevant characteristics of Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 
include inattention to details, difficulties in organization, and susceptibility to distraction.  
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 85-86 (4th ed., 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV].  Gender identity disorders can interfere 
with ordinary activities and impair social functioning.  Id. at 577.  Impulse control disorders are 
characterized by the failure to resist a variety of antisocial impulses.  Id. at 663. 
 61. Habershaw, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8977 at *19. 
 62. Id. at *20-21. 
 63. Id. at *21. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 402 A.2d 493 (N.H. 1979). 
 66. Id. at 498. 
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witnesses, including the arresting officers, testified that on the day of the 
search the defendant had appeared to them to be acting and reacting normally.  
Taken as a whole, the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the 
defendant had a sufficient understanding of the consequences of his consent to 
give a valid consent to the search.67 
North Carolina appellate courts have had several opportunities to consider 
this issue.  In State v. Fincher,68 the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld a 
finding of voluntary consent to a search for a defendant convicted of murder, 
rape, and burglary.69  At least ten officers were present for the arrest, at which 
time the defendant was Mirandized, handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car.70  
While in the car, the defendant was told that if he did not sign the consent to 
search form, the police would obtain a warrant, and that “[e]ither way, we are 
going to search the apartment.”71  At the suppression hearing, Fincher 
presented expert testimony that he was both mentally retarded and suffered 
from schizophrenia, sometimes to the point of hallucination.72  Experts also 
testified that Fincher, age seventeen, was functionally illiterate, had an IQ 
between 50 and 65, and was more susceptible to fear than the average person.73 
The court acknowledged that mental capacity and age were both factors to 
consider when determining whether consent was voluntary, but that “lack of 
intelligence does not, however, standing alone, render an in-custody statement 
incompetent if it is in all other respects voluntarily and understandingly 
made.”74  The court relied heavily on the lower court’s factual findings that 
there were no threats of violence or promises of rewards made by the police, 
and that Fincher did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs, 
limiting “coercion” to the use of force or promise of a benefit.75 
In State v. McDowell,76 the same court upheld a similar search where 
consent was given by a murder defendant’s mentally disabled girlfriend.77  The 
 
 67. Id. at 497 (citations omitted).  Although the court cited to cases holding that the belief of 
police officers as to the defendant’s mental state is irrelevant, the officers’ perceptions served as 
almost the exclusive basis for the court’s own holding.  Id. 
 68. 305 S.E.2d 685 (N.C. 1983). 
 69. Id. At 690-91. 
 70. Id. at 689. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 690. 
 73. Fincher, 305 S.E.2d at 690. 
 74. Id.  Note that the court fails to abide by its own rule; immediately after stating that lack 
of intelligence alone will not vitiate consent, the court notes that Fincher’s age is also a factor.  
The court also does not mention the fact of the ten officers in its analysis, another factor that 
should be considered under Schneckloth, which the court had cited with approval.  Id.  In this 
case, Fincher’s low intelligence was hardly “standing alone.” 
 75. Id. at 691. 
 76. 407 S.E.2d 200 (N.C. 1991). 
 77. Id. at 208. 
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trial court found that the girlfriend, twenty-two, was mentally retarded and had 
dropped out of school in the twelfth grade, “but can write her own name and 
can read to some extent.”78  The woman’s social worker testified that she was 
easily exploited, acquiescent to authority, and lacked the will to disagree with 
an authority figure.79  After noting that mental impairment is but a factor in the 
analysis, the court, without specifying, said that there was sufficient other 
evidence in the record to indicate that the woman understood the consent form 
when she signed it.80  The trial court’s findings “fully support[ed] the legal 
conclusion that Karen Curtis’[s] consent to the search was voluntarily and 
intelligently given, free from any duress or coercion.”81 
In State v. Collins,82 the Court of Appeals of Ohio also considered the 
intertwined issues of age and mental impairment in affirming the felonious 
assault conviction of an eighteen-year-old defendant with borderline mental 
retardation.83  Collins had a tested IQ of 76, but had graduated from high 
school.84  The court weighed Collins’ age and intellectual ability against the 
fact that he had been given Miranda warnings, and was questioned only briefly 
in his own home.85  Most significantly, the court said, Collins volunteered to 
retrieve the evidence and handed it over to the police, “‘clearly show[ing]’ that 
the suspect knowingly and voluntarily consented.”86 
In State v. Singleton,87 the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee upheld 
the murder conviction of a man who claimed that his consent was involuntary 
due to his below-average intelligence.88  Singleton signed a written consent 
form to search his farm, and police eventually discovered the body of the 
 
 78. Id. at 207. 
 79. Id. at 207-08. 
 80. Id. at 208. 
 81. McDowell, 407 S.E.2d at 208.  Faced with these two precedents from the state high 
court, it was short work for a lower state appellate court to uphold a finding of voluntary consent 
of a defendant convicted of drug trafficking.  State v. James, 454 S.E.2d 858 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1995).  While conducting a “drug sweep” on an interstate bus, police observed the defendant 
behaving nervously and obtained his consent to search him and his luggage, including a portable 
radio which contained the drugs.  Id. at 860.  At the suppression hearing, the defense expert 
testified that James had an IQ of 70, that he could only read three- and four-letter words, and that 
he had been conditioned in special education classes to be cooperative toward authority figures.  
Id. at 860-61.  Still, the court found ample evidence to support the trial court’s finding that James 
had consented voluntarily, especially considering that the defendant himself testified that he had 
consented of “his own free will.”  Id. at 862. 
 82. No. 95-A-0044, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 5805 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 1996). 
 83. Id. At *18. 
 84. Id. at *16. 
 85. Id at *16-18. 
 86. Id. at *20-21 (quoting State v. Rutter, 589 N.E.2d 421, 423 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)). 
 87. No. 03C01-9406-CR-00221, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 198 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 
13, 1995). 
 88. Id. At *1 
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victim in a padlocked freezer.89  The court noted that, although Singleton had 
an IQ of 74 and had encountered many difficulties in school, he also had the 
wherewithal to operate a tobacco farm and participate in a scheme to defraud 
the federal government of tobacco subsidies, which figured into the motive for 
the crime.90  In addition, Singleton had given oral consent to the police to 
search his farm at least twice in the days preceding the actual search and 
signing of the consent form, giving him “ample opportunity to reflect on his 
decision before granting written consent.”91  No pressure or use of force by the 
officers was alleged, and they testified that Singleton had been friendly and 
cooperative throughout.92 
In State v. Jolla,93 the Supreme Court of Louisiana upheld the validity of a 
consent to search given by a couple convicted of child abuse, where both 
defendants claimed a mental impairment.94  A child protection worker received 
a complaint that the couple was keeping seven-year-old twins in isolation and 
in deplorable conditions, and referred the matter routinely to police; the 
responding officer happened to know the family personally.95  In the course of 
a friendly but persistent exchange, the officer eventually coaxed permission 
from the couple to observe the twins in their bedroom, where conditions were 
as bad or worse than the informant had described.96  The officer, although 
maintaining a friendly and calm demeanor and informing the Jollas of their 
right to refuse him permission to search, persisted past the husband’s refusal 
and request to return another day.97  Despite the persistence, the court found 
the atmosphere to be free from coercion because the Jollas were not under 
arrest and were free to leave when they consented to the search.98 
Altogether, three state high courts, two federal appellate courts and several 
other trial and lower appellate courts treated the issue of how mental 
impairment relates to voluntary consent with little more than perfunctory 
analysis.  Typically, lower court findings were upheld with a restatement of the 
facts of the case and a sentence or two of analysis. 
 
 89. Id. at *3-4. 
 90. Id. at *12. 
 91. Id. at *13. 
 92. Singleton, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 198 at *6, *13. 
 93. 384 So. 2d 370 (La. 1980). 
 94. Id. at 371.  Interestingly, although the Jollas both had tested IQs of 67, they did not raise 
this fact in relation to their consent to the search; they made the mental deficiency claim only with 
respect to the waiver of their Miranda rights prior to giving taped statements to the police.  Id. at 
372-74. 
 95. Id. at 371. 
 96. Id. at 371-72. 
 97. Id. at 372. 
 98. Jolla, 384 So. 2d at 373.  Mr. Jolla, in fact, left the house at one point during the search.  
Id. 
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B. Confusing the Issues 
In United States v. Velasquez,99 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld 
the validity of a warrantless search where consent was given by a woman who 
suffered, according to both defense and state psychiatrists, from an adjustment 
disorder.100  The defense expert had testified that the disorder, coupled with the 
stress of the detention, completely undermined the woman’s voluntary 
consent.101  The court relegated its discussion of the defendant’s mental health 
to a footnote, which merely referenced the discussion of Velasquez’s 
competency to stand trial.  In that discussion, the court upheld the trial court’s 
ruling that “however irrational her decisions not to disclose information [to 
counsel] were, she was not incapable of assisting counsel by reason of mental 
defect.”102  How the standard for competency to stand trial relates to the 
standard for determining whether a consent to search is voluntary was not 
explained.  The court reasoned that, because she was merely detained inside 
the patrol car during a traffic stop when consent was given rather than under 
formal arrest, coercive factors were minimized.103  There were no allegations 
of threats or promises by the police, and Velasquez was college-educated and 
fluent in English.104 
In United States v. Rosario-Diaz,105 the First Circuit Court of Appeals, 
dealing with a defendant who had a tested IQ in the mid-70s and no prior 
involvement with the police, upheld the admission of evidence obtained 
pursuant to one of the defendants’ consent.106  The court weighed the defense 
expert’s testimony against that of a government expert and the arresting 
officer, who testified that the defendant “understood what was happening when 
she waived her Fifth Amendment rights and consented to the search.”107  The 
court emphasized the absence of coercive conduct by the police, either 
physical or psychological.108  The court also lumped the issues of voluntary 
 
 99. 885 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 100. Id. at 1082.  Adjustment disorders are “psychological response[s] to an identifiable 
stressor or stressors that results in . . . clinically significant emotional or behavioral symptoms.”  
DSM-IV, supra note 60, at 679.  The psychological reaction can cause significant impairment in 
social interactions.  Id. 
 101. Velasquez, 885 F.2d at 1082. 
 102. Id. at 1089-90. 
 103. Id. at 1082.  In fact, because the officer asked her into the car because it was “warmer 
and quieter than outside,” the court found “no coercion” in the situation, apparently considering it 
quite significant that Velasquez could still see her companion in the other car.  Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. 202 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 106. Id. at 69. 
 107. Id.  The Fifth Amendment protects defendants against making self-incriminating 
statements and also affords a right to counsel before police questioning; it is unrelated to 
consensual searches.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 108. Rosario-Diaz, 202 F.3d at 69. 
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confession and voluntary consent together, and treated both as governed by 
Connelly.109 
In United States v. Major,110 a federal district court denied a motion to 
suppress evidence seized pursuant to the consent of Thomas Major, a forty-
seven-year-old, college-educated businessman accused of money 
laundering.111  Major testified at the suppression hearing that he and his family 
had fled Hungary to escape anti-Semitism when he was eight years old and 
that, at the border with Austria, a Russian soldier had shot and killed their 
guide just a few feet from him.112  When agents entered his office, Major said 
he was afraid for his life and could only think about the shooting of the 
guide.113  Major’s father, a Holocaust survivor, had ingrained in him the 
attitude to always cooperate in confrontational situations because the goal was 
to simply survive.114  A psychiatrist also testified, giving his diagnosis that 
Major suffered from Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, and stating that his 
childhood experience made Major more susceptible to comply with law 
enforcement.115 
The court did not discuss Major’s mental state issues in the portion of its 
opinion dealing with consent to the search but did when ruling on the motion 
to suppress other statements he made at the time.116  The court noted that there 
was no evidence that the agents took advantage of any susceptibility Major 
may have had, nor were they aware of it.117  The judge also found that, 
although Major may have been initially shocked when confronted by the gun-
wielding agents, he regained his composure after the weapons were 
holstered.118  Ultimately, the judge’s decision turned on credibility, and she 
elected to accept the account of the police officer who testified at the 
hearing.119 
 
 109. Id. at 69; see also supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. 
 110. 912 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 111. Id. at 93. 
 112. Id. at 94. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.  For a dramatic account of how surviving the Holocaust can impact one’s life, see 
ELIE WIESEL, NIGHT (Stella Rodway trans., 1960) (1958). 
 115. Major, 912 F. Supp at 94.  Posttraumatic Stress Disorder produces intense feelings of 
fear, helplessness, or horror as a response to a direct personal experience that involves actual or 
threatened death or serious bodily injury.  DSM-IV, supra note 60, at 463. 
 116. Major, 912 F. Supp at 96.  Because the Miranda warning was given to Major, the overall 
standard for determining voluntariness (totality of the circumstances) would be the same for both 
questions, although the court does not explicitly make this point.  Welsh S. White, What Is an 
Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001, 2004 (1998). 
 117. Major, 912 F. Supp. at 96. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 97. 
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In State v. Blakely,120 the Court of Appeals of New Mexico attempted 
unsuccessfully to articulate a clear test for mental capacity to consent to a 
search in affirming a drug possession conviction in 1993.121  Police responded 
to a 911 call from the defendant, who had threatened suicide, and, according to 
departmental procedure, took him into custody for a mental health 
evaluation.122  During the pat down, Blakely volunteered that he had a syringe 
and some drugs in his pocket.123  In addition to his mental health problems, 
Blakely claimed that his intoxication rendered his consent invalid.124  Although 
the issue was consent to search, the court applied the prevailing test that had 
been developed in state courts for determining the validity of an incriminating 
statement, stating that “the defendant must have had sufficient mental capacity 
at the time he made the statement to be conscious of the physical acts 
performed by him, to retain them in his memory, and to state them with 
reasonable accuracy.”125  Because Blakely correctly informed the officer that 
there were drugs in his pocket, he obviously was conscious of his physical acts, 
remembered them, and could articulate them accurately, the court reasoned.126  
The court also found that coercive police activity, absent here, was a necessary 
precondition to finding a statement to be involuntary.127 
Four courts, although they gave more depth to their analysis and explained 
their holdings much more extensively than the cases in the previous section, 
still did not provide clear guidance on the issue of mental impairment and 
voluntary consent.  These courts typically imported standards related to 
confessions or competency to stand trial, but they did not explain how or why 
these standards should be applied to consent searches. 
C. Careful Analysis 
The Eighth Circuit considered the validity and voluntary nature of consent 
in United States v. Gipp,128 where the defendant claimed both that he was 
under the influence of drugs and that the officer’s approach re-aggravated his 
posttraumatic stress disorder.129  The court took a bifurcated approach, 
 
 120. 853 P.2d 168 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 170.  Although the mental health center determined that Blakely did not need to be 
committed, he attempted suicide in jail later that same day.  Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 171. 
 125. Blakely, 853 P.2d at 171.  This is also quite similar to the standard for determining a 
witness’s competency to testify.  See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 601. 
 126. Blakely, 853 P.2d at 171.  One might well note that, based on this test, as long as the 
police actually find incriminating evidence based on consent, the search will be deemed 
voluntary. 
 127. Id. 
 128. 147 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 129. Id. at 685. 
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examining both the characteristics of the person giving consent, including 
intoxication and intelligence, and the environment in which consent was 
given.130  The court noted the absence of threats, promises, or any 
psychological coercion, and the short duration of the detention.131  Turning to 
the intoxication and mental impairment issues, the court noted that the defense 
expert could not testify with precision as to how impaired the defendant was at 
the time consent was given and observed that the defendant answered 
questions intelligently, behaved rationally, and did not exhibit any symptoms 
of impairment.132 
In United States v. Hall,133 the District of Columbia Circuit upheld as 
voluntary a consent to search given by an eighteen-year-old woman with an IQ 
of 76 and a history of psychological problems.134  An expert testified that, 
given Hall’s reading and language skills of a seven- or eight-year-old child, her 
other cognitive abilities, and a borderline personality disorder, she was 
incapable of voluntary consent “without some explicit statement and perhaps 
restatement of her right to refuse.”135  The expert said that, because of her 
mental impairments, the anxiety and fear of the situation rendered her 
incapable of even questioning whether she was free to leave.136 
The appellate court eschewed a “reasonable person” standard and said that 
the key question was whether the defendant in fact felt subjectively compelled 
to consent.137  To answer this question, the court used the same bifurcated 
analysis identified in Gipp, considering separately police coercive activity and 
the defendant’s subjective mental state.138  The court recognized that “[t]here is 
inevitably some pressure or apprehension on the part of an individual 
whenever the police approach and begin asking questions. . . . Moreover, that 
pressure and apprehension is bound to be heightened when the questioning 
occurs in the middle of the night in a relatively deserted parking lot.”139  
However, the fact that the officer was in plain clothes, spoke conversationally, 
had his weapon concealed, and did not use any force or threats mitigated the 
coerciveness of the situation.140 
For the subjective factors, the court concluded that the expert testimony on 
Hall’s mental impairment was undercut to a degree by the fact that Hall 
 
 130. Id. at 685-86. 
 131. Id. at 686.  Gipp’s car was searched during a traffic stop.  Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. 969 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 134. Id. at 1106. 
 135. Id. at 1105. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 1106. 
 138. Hall, 969 F.2d at 1107; see also supra  text accompanying note 130. 
 139. Hall, 969 F.2d at 1107. 
 140. Id. 
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initially lied to police in response to some questions, eventually refused to 
answer questions, and requested an attorney, demonstrating that she had the 
capacity to resist police questioning.141  The court noted that this was a close 
question, but it was ultimately restrained by the “clearly erroneous” standard of 
review on the issue.142 
In State v. Allies,143 the Supreme Court of Montana upheld a trial judge’s 
finding that a murder defendant suffering from a borderline personality 
disorder and under the influence of drugs did not voluntarily consent to a 
search.144  The court noted the defendant’s drug dependence and several items 
of coercive police conduct, including the use of deception, isolation in a small 
room, the “good cop-bad cop” interrogation technique, and the intimation that 
Allies’s difficulties were medical, rather than criminal, in nature.145  Yet, the 
court concluded that the expert psychiatric testimony demonstrated that, even 
had those factors not been present, “there is doubt that the defendant was 
capable of voluntarily and knowingly consenting to the search.”146  The 
defendant’s mental condition may have prevented a rational decision on 
whether to waive his constitutional rights.147  The court was particularly 
concerned that the police officers were well aware of Allies’s condition; in 
their own testimony, they described him as “talking to the walls” and 
“completely out of it.”148  During interrogation, Allies also professed a belief 
that the “Space Brothers” were exerting an evil influence over him and that he 
had been cursed by his ex-wife; he also threatened to commit suicide.149  The 
Montana Supreme Court also adopted the bifurcated method of analysis, 
saying that “‘totality of the circumstances’ . . . includes not only the police 
techniques . . . but also the testimony presented of the defendant’s mental 
condition.”150 
In State v. Williams,151one of the rare cases where a state appellate court 
has overturned a trial judge’s finding of voluntary consent given by a mentally 
impaired person, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia ordered a 
 
 141. Id. at 1108.  However, even children as young as three will lie in order to avoid 
anticipated unpleasant consequences.  ARLENE EISENBERG ET AL., WHAT TO EXPECT: THE 
TODDLER YEARS 460-62 (1994). 
 142. Hall, 969 F.2d at 1109. 
 143. 621 P.2d 1080 (Mont. 1980). 
 144. Id. at 1088. 
 145. Id. at 1085-86.  For a criticism of the coercive nature of these techniques and others, see 
WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES 
AFTER DICKERSON 25-38 (2001). 
 146. Allies, 621 P.2d at 1086. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 1087. 
 151. 249 S.E.2d 758 (W. Va. 1978). 
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new trial for a man convicted of first degree murder.152  The defendant was 
awakened from an alcohol-induced sleep and accompanied by five police 
officers back to the station, where he subsequently gave consent to search his 
jacket and eventually confessed to the crime.153  The court noted that consent 
obtained in a custodial situation “must be subjected to the most careful 
scrutiny.”154  On the issue of mental impairment, the defendant had presented 
expert testimony that his IQ was 60.155  Williams also testified at the 
suppression hearing that he could not read or write except for his name and had 
never completed elementary school.156  The officers, aware of his limited 
intelligence, went to great lengths to help him understand his rights.157  
Nonetheless, his mental impairment, combined with the custodial situation and 
the presence of so many officers, clearly pointed to “mere submission to 
authority,” rather than voluntary consent.158 
In State v. Sondergaard,159 the Court of Appeals of Washington upheld a 
trial court’s finding of lack of valid consent given by a woman who was 
hallucinating at the time she was approached by the police.160  The woman, 
when approached in her hotel room, was rocking back and forth, pointing 
randomly about the room; she told the police that stationary objects were 
moving about.161  The officer was not coercive, made no threats or promises, 
and merely asked the woman if he could look inside her purse.162  Despite the 
lack of coercive police conduct, the court suppressed the drugs seized from the 
defendant’s purse, reasoning that “[w]hen a person with an obvious mental 
disability or incapacity gives what appears to be a consent to search, that 
apparent consent is not necessarily rendered voluntary simply because the 
police asked for consent in a non-threatening manner.”163  The court declined 
the state’s invitation to apply Connelly164 to the consent search context and 
 
 152. Id. at 765. 
 153. Id. at 762. 
 154. Id. at 763. 
 155. Id. at 764. 
 156. Williams, 249 S.E.2d. at 762. 
 157. Id. at 761. 
 158. Id. at 764.  The court, however, undercuts its reasoning by citing the “no sane man” rule 
of Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1954).  Id.  The Higgins rule, which states 
that no sane person who denies his guilt would actually be willing to allow police to search for 
easily-discovered incriminating evidence, has been roundly criticized and rejected.  See, e.g., 
Leavitt v. Howard, 462 F.2d 992 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Gorman, 355 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 
1965); LAFAVE, supra note 37, at § 8.1. 
 159. 938 P.2d 351 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). 
 160. Id. at 355. 
 161. Id. at 352. 
 162. Id. at 353. 
 163. Id. at 354. 
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 33-37. 
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argued that federal cases continued to suggest that lack of capacity, standing 
alone, could vitiate an apparent consent.165 
In the recent case of State v. Bocanegra,166 the Court of Appeals of 
Washington had the opportunity to directly apply the rule and reasoning of 
Sondergaard to a slightly different factual situation.167  Following up on a tip 
that Edward Bocanegra was growing marijuana on his property, the police 
went to the house and obtained consent from his mother to search the 
premises.168  After detecting some signs of marijuana growing from a locked 
garage, the officers obtained a search warrant, pursuant to which they 
discovered a large number of marijuana plants.169  At the pretrial hearing, 
testimony ensued that the mother had been raised and educated in Germany, 
and that she suffered from chronic paranoid schizophrenia, which the defense 
expert said combined to render her unable to understand the consent to search 
form.170  While noting the precedent, the court distinguished the case due to the 
fact that the police were on notice in Sondergaard as to the defendant’s mental 
illness, thus making it unreasonable to rely on her consent.171  Mrs. Hoffman-
Bocanegra, by contrast, displayed no signs of mental illness, with “no evidence 
that the police knew or should have known that Hoffman-Bocanegra . . . was 
mentally incompetent and incapable of consenting to the search.”172 
This review of the available cases underscores that courts are in need of 
better guidance on how to apply the due process voluntariness standard to 
consent given by a mentally impaired person.  Courts that make a serious effort 
to address the issue often still find themselves in a legal morass as they attempt 
to import standards relating to mental competency from other areas of criminal 
procedure and shoehorn them into the voluntariness test.  Even courts that have 
developed and follow a clear and well thought-out test that does not stray from 
the issue at hand reveal a fatal defect in applying the voluntariness test to this 
population: Courts rely heavily on the degree to which the person’s condition 
was readily apparent to the investigating officers, leading to unequal treatment 
of individuals with similar degrees of impairment. 
 
 165. Sondergaard, 938 P.2d 354-55. 
 166. No. 28151-1-II, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 1877 at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2003). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at *2. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at *4-*6.  Schizophrenia can include a wide range of cognitive impairment related to 
perception, volition, inferential thinking, communication, and thought production and may 
involve hallucinations, delusional thinking, and disorganized thinking and behavior.  DSM-IV, 
supra note 60, at 299-300. 
 171. Bocanegra, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 1877 at *6-7. 
 172. Id. at *7. 
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IV.  BEHAVIOR THEORY AND THE MENTALLY ILL AND DISABLED 
In the 1960s, Stanley Milgram performed a series of experiments that have 
become among the most widely known and cited in the history of behavioral 
psychology.173  Although he conducted many variations of the experiments 
over the years, the basic design was the same for all of them.174  People would 
come, in response to an advertisement, to participate in an experiment 
purportedly related to memory and learning.  Upon arrival, one person would 
be designated the “teacher” and another the “learner.”  The learner was taken 
to another room and strapped into a chair with an electrode attached to his 
wrist.  The learner, in reality an actor, was not actually hooked up to any 
devices, but was to play a key role in the experiment.  The teacher, on the other 
hand, was the walk-in participant and went with the researcher to a kind of 
control room where the researcher explained the details of the experiment.  The 
purpose, the teacher was told, was to measure the effect of punishment on 
learning.  A “shock generator” with a range of switches marked from 15 volts 
to 450 volts in 15-volt increments was in the control room.  Accompanying 
labels ranged from “Slight Shock” to “Danger—Severe Shock.”  Two switches 
at the very end of the row were simply labeled “XXX.” 
The teacher was instructed to administer the test to the learner in the next 
room.  With each correct response, he was to move on the next item, but 
incorrect responses or refusals to answer were to be met with shocks of 
sequentially increasing intensity.  The learner, of course, had been instructed to 
purposely answer many of the questions incorrectly and, in addition, to begin 
displaying signs of discomfort at various points.  When he received a “shock” 
of 75 volts, the learner would grunt; at 120 volts, he complained verbally; at 
150, he would demand to be released.  The protests grew increasingly strong as 
 
 173. ARTHUR G. MILLER, THE OBEDIENCE EXPERIMENTS: A CASE STUDY OF CONTROVERSY 
IN SOCIAL SCIENCE v (1986); Thomas Blass, The Milgram Paradigm After 35 Years: Some 
Things We Now Know About Obedience to Authority, in OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: CURRENT 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE MILGRAM PARADIGM 36-37 (Thomas Blass ed., 2000).  Arguably, only 
the work of B.F. Skinner, who created a box that rewarded rats with a food pellet for giving a 
desired response such as pressing a lever, and Ivan Pavlov, who conditioned dogs to salivate at 
the sound of a ringing bell, are more readily recognized in the field.  See, e.g., Robert M. Yerkes 
& Sergius Morgulis, The Method of Pavlov in Animal Psychology, in A HISTORY OF 
PSYCHOLOGY: ORIGINAL SOURCES AND CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 345 (Ludy T. Benjamin, 
Jr., ed., 2nd ed. 1997); James H. Capshew, Engineering Behavior: Project Pigeon, World War II 
and the Conditioning of B.F. Skinner, in A HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY: ORIGINAL SOURCES AND 
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH, supra, at 472. 
 174. See François Rochat & Andre Modigliani, Authority: Obedience, Defiance, and 
Identification in Experimental and Historical Contexts, in A NEW OUTLINE OF SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 235 (Martin Gold & Elizabeth Douvan eds., 1997). 
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the shocks progressed, culminating in an “agonized scream” at 285 volts and 
higher levels.175 
As the teacher reacted to the protests of the learner and hesitated or 
expressed concerns about continuing, the researcher would use a series of 
verbal prods: “[p]lease continue;” “[t]he experiment requires that you 
continue;” “[i]t is absolutely essential that you continue;” and “[y]ou have no 
other choice, you must go on.”176  The researcher was “firm, but not 
impolite.”177  If the teacher refused to continue after all four prods, the 
experiment was over.  In “Experiment 5,” which was conducted in a basement 
rather than an elegant Yale University laboratory, the learner was also 
instructed to mention a fictitious heart condition in his protests.178  
Nonetheless, 65 percent of the teachers remained obedient throughout the 
experiment, administering the highest “shocks” possible to the learners.179  The 
average maximum shock delivered was between 360 and 375 volts, well 
beyond the point where learners began screaming and begging to be 
released.180 
Milgram concluded that a variety of social forces program people to obey 
authority figures.181  First, social conditioning “prepares” people to obey 
authority figures; children obey teachers in school, moviegoers obey ushers in 
the theater, and thus subjects are more likely to obey the experimenter in the 
experiment.182  This theory essentially means that it is the authority of the 
situation, rather than the personality or behavior of the experimenter, that 
engenders obedience.183  Second, Milgram also theorized that the subjects were 
in an “agentic state” where they viewed themselves as carrying out another 
 
 175. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 3-4, 14-26 
(1974). 
 176. Id. at 21. 
 177. Id.  The role of the researcher was played by a high school biology teacher, who dressed 
for the part in a gray technician’s coat.  Id. at 16. 
 178. Id. at 55-56.  The “learner” was played by a forty-seven-year-old accountant whom most 
participants found “mild-mannered and likable.”  Id. at 16.  The full script of the learner’s 
responses, including the references to the heart problem, underscores the intensity of the 
experiment.  Id. at 56-57. 
 179. Id. at 60. 
 180. MILGRAM, supra note 175, at 60. 
 181. See Adrian J. Barrio, Note, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating 
Obedience Theory Into the Supreme Court’s Conception of Voluntary Consent, 1997 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 215, 236.  As Milgram himself noted, the dramatic quality of the experiment is “somewhat 
obscured in print.  For the subject, the situation is not a game; conflict is intense and obvious.”  
MILGRAM, supra note 175, at 4. 
 182. Barrio, supra note 181, at 236. 
 183. See id.; John Sabini & Maury Silver, Dispositional vs. Situational Interpretations of 
Milgram’s Obedience Experiments:”The Fundamental Attribution Error,” 13 J. THEORY SOC. 
BEHAV. 147, 151 (1983). 
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person’s wishes and were thus less responsible for their own actions.184  
Finally, Milgram’s experiments pointed to specific situational facts that 
encouraged obedience, such as the subjects’ politeness, the awkwardness of 
walking out of the experiment, and the desire to uphold their initial promise to 
the researcher.185 
Milgram demonstrated that people will often perform actions against their 
own moral judgment even though they will gain nothing from obeying and 
there are few consequences for disobeying the request of an authority figure.186  
Even in friendly encounters, most people feel very uncomfortable in refusing a 
police request.187 
Milgram’s research, though widely known, has not been universally 
hailed.188  The ethics of the experiments were soundly decried, with strong 
objections to the use of deception and to the prospect of delivering electric 
shocks to human subjects, almost from the moment Milgram’s initial study 
was published.189  Milgram was criticized for allowing the goal of expanding 
human knowledge to justify his ethically questionable experimental means, an 
assertion he did not precisely refute.190  Other critics more directly attacked 
Milgram’s methodology and results.191  One critic argued that it was the 
laboratory setting, with the “teachers” investing a heavy importance in the 
scientific nature of the experiment and the expertise of the researcher, that 
induced obedience.192  Behavior in the laboratory “must be interpreted, taking 
into account the determining role of the laboratory context itself.”193  Other 
critics suggested that the fact that the experimenter remained dispassionate and 
did not display any concern toward the “learner” was a subtle tip-off to the 
“teacher” about the true nature of the experiment.194  People typically trust that 
scenarios where psychological researchers inflict intense pain on their research 
subjects do not occur, so the participants simply readjusted their view and 
decided that it was “safe” to shock the learners.195  Other critics cautioned 
against trying to extrapolate Milgram’s results beyond the setting of a lab, 
 
 184. See MILGRAM, supra note 175, at 143-52. 
 185. See Sabini & Silver, supra note 183, at 147-48. 
 186. Id. at 150-51. 
 187. Barrio, supra note 181, at 216. 
 188. See MILLER, supra note 173, at v. 
 189. Id. at 88-90. 
 190. See id. at 88-91. 
 191. See generally id. at 139-78. 
 192. Id. at 141. 
 193. MILLER, supra note 173, at 142. 
 194. Id. at 143-44. 
 195. Id.  This argument is undercut when one reads the transcripts of Milgram’s research 
sessions and understands the very real agitation and concern for the “learner” displayed by many 
of the “teachers.” See, e.g., MILGRAM, supra note 175, at 73-77. 
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where the role of authority was played by a scientific researcher.196  Despite 
the criticism, however, Milgram’s research is generally accepted and viewed as 
having significant value in the field.197 
This human tendency to automatically obey authority figures becomes an 
especially acute problem when considering the mentally impaired, as they are 
more likely than the average person to respond to pressure and coercion.198  
Mentally retarded individuals have an especially strong desire to please others, 
particularly authority figures, and often will tell them whatever it is the 
individual thinks they want to hear.199  Consistent with Milgram’s social 
conditioning hypothesis, mentally retarded individuals are thought to obey 
authority figures more often because they usually have several people in 
authority over them and have often been through training programs to increase 
their compliance with authority.200 
Mentally retarded individuals are also much more likely to respond “yes” 
to questions regardless of what is actually being asked and whether that 
response is even appropriate—a phenomenon known as “acquiescence.”201  
Several reasons have been forwarded for the increased “acquiescence” of 
mentally impaired individuals.  Studies show that “acquiescence” is inversely 
related to IQ scores and directly related to the strength of the suggestion.202  
Responding affirmatively has also been viewed as a default response strategy 
for retarded individuals who do not understand either the question or the 
appropriate answer.203  Individuals with mental retardation have been shown to 
be particularly suggestible when the question contains sophisticated or abstract 
ideals or when they are uncertain of the details.204  In addition, individuals with 
mental retardation are much more likely to change their response if the 
questioner indicates even mild disapproval.205 
 
 196. MILLER, supra note 173, at 149. 
 197. Id. at 256. 
 198. Everington & Fulero, supra note 4, at 212. 
 199. Id. at 213. 
 200. W. M. L. Finlay & E. Lyons, Acquiescence in Interviews with People Who Have Mental 
Retardation, 40 MENTAL RETARDATION 14, 18 (2002). 
 201. Everington & Fulero, supra note 4, at 213.  Acquiescence has been defined as “the 
tendency to agree with or say yes to statements or questions, regardless of the content of the 
items.”  Finlay & Lyons, supra note 200, at 14 (citation omitted). 
 202. Finlay & Lyons, supra note 200, at 19-20.  Other factors that have been shown to 
increase suggestibility are a belief and personal trust that the interviewer’s intentions are genuine 
and the belief that the interviewer expects the subject to know and provide an answer.  Id. at 20. 
 203. Id. at 20. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Everington & Fulero, supra note 4, at 218.  The authors found such “shifting” was 
prevalent even in regard to questions about a story the individuals had listened to, rather than 
questions about their own culpability for a crime.  “One can speculate that if this group of 
individuals is so suggestible in this low-risk questioning situation, then they might be even more 
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V.  THE INADEQUACY OF THE SCHNECKLOTH VOLUNTARINESS STANDARD 
Application of the totality of the circumstances standard from 
Schneckloth206 is problematic at best in trial court rulings on the voluntariness 
of consent given by mentally impaired individuals, as “a conclusion on 
voluntariness is expected to emerge from a hopper into which all factors, 
volitional and cognitive, are randomly thrown.”207  That problem becomes 
uniquely exacerbated when a court has to contend with the additional claim 
that mental impairment invalidated apparent consent.208  Justice Thurgood 
Marshall anticipated the problems and the inherent inconsistency of the 
standard in his dissenting opinion in Schneckloth.209  Marshall wrote that the 
court had missed the key issue by misplacing its focus on coercive police 
conduct.210  The real inquiry should have been “whether a simple statement of 
assent to search, without more, should be sufficient to permit the police to 
search . . . .”211 
Marshall argued that adopting the due process voluntariness standard from 
confession cases was not the correct approach because the context of consent 
searches and confessions are very different.212  In the confession context, 
knowledge of the right to be free from coercion is irrelevant—no one would 
give up the right to be free from coercion.213  Rather, the Miranda warnings 
serve to mitigate the coercive effects of a custodial interrogation.214  Consent to 
a search is a different concept than simply being free from coercion, Marshall 
argued.215  Consent is a means to circumvent the substantive requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment, namely the warrant requirement and its exceptions 
 
likely to respond to suggestible questions and to ‘shift’ their answers when the pressure is 
greater.”  Id. 
 206. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); see also supra notes 12-27 and 
accompanying text. 
 207. JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 80-81 (1993).  Some have 
argued that courts’ strained reading of the Fourth Amendment results from the pressure of the 
exclusionary rule, whose strict application would prevent highly probative evidence, often of very 
serious crimes, from being admitted.  See, e.g., STEVEN R. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY 
INJUSTICE: THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 63 (1977). 
 208. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 117 (1987) (noting that “the Court entirely ignores 
the cognitive dimension of consent . . . .”).  In the confession context, one prominent author 
observed that courts often confuse cognitive issues with coercive police conduct issues.  GRANO, 
supra note 207, at 80. 
 209. As Solicitor General of the United States, Marshall had argued in favor of the Miranda 
decision before the Supreme Court in 1966.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 438 (1984). 
 210. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 278 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 211. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 212. Id. at 280.  Marshall notes that “the phrase ‘voluntary consent’ seems redundant in a way 
that the phrase ‘voluntary confession’ does not.” Id. at n.6. 
 213. Id. at 281. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 282. 
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related to exigent circumstances, which are related to justifiable law 
enforcement needs.216  Consent searches are not an exception to the warrant 
requirement by the same rationale as those based on exigent circumstances; 
rather, they are permitted because citizens are free to choose whether to 
exercise their constitutional right to be free from a search conducted without 
probable cause.217 
Marshall feared that the majority’s holding would limit Fourth Amendment 
rights to those sophisticated and knowledgeable enough to assert them on their 
own.218  The practical impact of the ruling would inevitably result in police 
conducting “a charade of asking for consent.  If they display any firmness at 
all, a verbal expression of assent will undoubtedly be forthcoming.”219  
Marshall would not necessarily have required police to inform suspects of their 
right to refuse consent, but he saw that as the simplest way for the prosecution 
to satisfy its burden of showing the suspect’s knowledge of his or her rights.220 
The distinction the Schneckloth majority made between the criteria for 
voluntariness of consent and voluntariness of confession is somewhat 
contrived.221  This is probably because the definition the Court created for 
voluntary consent is a legal fiction, essentially a public policy compromise 
between the needs of law enforcement and the need for public perception of 
the criminal justice system as fair.222  This artificial approach, and its analytical 
consequence of shoving the cognitive aspects of voluntariness aside, leads to 
oddly juxtaposed decisions where one seriously impaired person is deemed to 
have voluntarily consented while a modestly impaired person is deemed to 
have not.223  In fact, using the voluntariness standard for consent searches has 
led to the same problems that led the Court to ultimately reconsider that 
standard in the confession context in the Miranda decision.224 
 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 283. 
 218. Id. at 289. 
 219. Id. at 284. 
 220. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 286. 
 221. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 208, at 116.  Professor Wertheimer points out that the 
Schneckloth majority echoed the dissenting opinion in Miranda, and he argues that the 
Schneckloth decision was really an expression on the part of the majority that Miranda had been 
wrongly decided.  Id. 
 222. Kaplan & Dixon, supra note 2, at 950. 
 223. Compare State v. McDowell, 407 S.E.2d 200 (N.C. 1991), with State v. Allies, 621 P.2d 
1080 (Mont. 1981).  See also supra notes 76, 143. 
 224. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 869-72 
(1981) (reviewing YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSION: ESSAYS IN LAW 
AND POLICY (1980)).  Professor Schulhofer identified six defects in the voluntariness test: It fails 
to provide guidance to police officers; application of the standard nearly always involves a 
“swearing contest” between police officers and the defendant; the test allows police to use 
considerable pressure; it encourages manipulation of the weak; it fails to adequately check police 
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Even more troubling is that judicial attempts to adapt the voluntariness 
standard to the specific situation of the mentally disabled have shown 
themselves to be inadequate for the task.225  The courts in Sondergaard and 
Bocanegra, for example, applied exactly the same test, yet they each reached 
different outcomes based solely on the fact that in one case officers were at 
least on notice of the suspect’s disability, while in the other case they were 
not.226  Two individuals with similar levels of impairment were treated very 
differently based exclusively on the accident of a perceptive officer, a more 
readily apparent manifestation of their condition, or other factors completely 
unrelated to the act of consenting to the search. 
The application of Milgram’s research to the authority of the police in the 
consent search context is clear.  Milgram himself, although not specifically 
addressing the problem, anticipated it in a 1965 article.  He noted: 
If in this study an anonymous experimenter could successfully command 
adults to subdue a fifty-year-old man, and force on him painful electric shocks 
against his protests, one can only wonder what government, with its vastly 
greater authority and prestige, can command of its subjects.227 
VI.  THE PROPOSED TEST 
There are several possibilities that courts could adopt to address the 
problem of consent given by the mentally impaired with more sensitivity, 
consistency and thoroughness.  From the research of Milgram and others, some 
have drawn the conclusion that a Miranda-type warning is needed when police 
seek consent to perform a warrantless search.228  In fact, in a subsequent 
variation of his experiment, where Milgram allowed the “teacher” to choose 
which shock level to administer (in effect giving them a warning that they need 
not proceed to the most harmful level), only one of the forty subjects 
administered the highest voltage, and the average voltage delivered was 
between seventy-five and ninety volts.229 
 
brutality; and, perhaps most troubling, the voluntariness standard “impair[s] the effectiveness and 
the legitimacy of judicial review.”  Id.  In the pre-Miranda confession context, “conscientious 
trial judges [were] left without guidance for resolving confession claims [and] they were virtually 
invited to give weight to their subjective preferences when performing the elusive task of 
balancing.”  Id. at 869-70.  Both trial and appellate judges concerned about the release of a 
dangerous offender often look the other way and permit tactics that should have led to exclusion 
if the standard had been properly followed.  See id. at 870. 
 225. See Cloud et al., supra note 4, at 572. 
 226. See supra notes 159-72 and accompanying text. 
 227. Stanley Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority, 18 
HUMAN RELATIONS 57, 75 (1965). 
 228. Barrio, supra note 181, at 246-47. 
 229. MILGRAM, supra note 175, at 61, 70-72. 
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Subsequent research based on the “Milgram paradigm” examined various 
potential bases of social power that might have induced the high rates of 
obedience in the Milgram experiments and determined that coercive power 
was a key component of obedience despite the polite and clinical demeanor of 
the researcher in the Milgram experiment.230  However, because Schneckloth 
minimized and marginalized the role of the subjective perception of police 
authority and coercion,231 the likelihood that courts would now move to 
broadly require Miranda-type warnings for consent searches is highly unlikely.  
Furthermore, in the context of mentally impaired individuals, even an explicit 
warning is unlikely to be effective.232  And warnings in and of themselves, 
particularly if not understood, are little guarantee against the use of subtle 
coercive techniques.233 
Another possibility would be to supplement the Schneckloth standard with 
some additional criteria, evaluated within a consistent analytical framework, to 
achieve more coherent and fair results when analyzing consent given by 
mentally impaired individuals.  Several courts, including the Courts of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit and the Supreme Court 
of Montana, have already attempted such a solution.234  In the test adopted by 
these courts, the person claiming a mental impairment has the initial burden to 
come forward with evidence to support their claim, although the prosecution 
would still have the ultimate burden of proving that consent was given 
voluntarily.235 
The court then uses a two-step approach to analyze voluntariness.  First, 
the court examines the relevant facts that bear on the characteristics of the 
consenter.  This step requires an analysis of the nature and extent of the 
 
 230. See Blass, supra note 173, at 42-44. 
 231. See Kaplan & Dixon, supra note 2, at 950.  More than one federal court has taken a dim 
view of a variation on the “obedience to authority” argument, rejecting the idea that one’s 
acquiescent attitude toward police, regardless of the source, can ever be a relevant factor in the 
voluntariness analysis.  See United States v. Arias-Mata, No. 97-20067-03-EEO, 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6499, at *6-7 (D. Kan. Apr. 8, 1998) (quoting United States v. Zapata, 997 F.2d 751, 759 
(10th Cir. 1993)). 
 232. Everington & Fulero, supra note 4, at 217.  “[I]t is clear that individuals with mental 
retardation have significant problems in comprehension of the Miranda warning.”  Id.  A very 
thorough and influential study concluded that individuals with mental retardation literally do not 
understand the definitions of most of the words used in the Miranda warnings.  Cloud et al., supra 
note 4, at 541.  Everington and Fulero recommend that when a suspect is believed to have a 
disability, extra effort should be made to ensure they understand their rights.  This practice is 
more effectively done by having the individual explain the meaning of the questions in their own 
words, rather than relying on responses to yes/no questions.  Everington & Fulero, supra note 4, 
at 219. 
 233. See Gentile v. United States, 419 U.S. 979, 982 (1974). 
 234. See notes 128-150 and accompanying text. 
 235. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). 
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claimed mental impairment at a suppression hearing.  The second step of this 
analysis would include all of the traditional coercive factors.236  Courts here 
could bring much more careful scrutiny to the use of police deception in 
obtaining consent.  The use of deception to induce someone to give up their 
right to be free from unreasonable searches is tantamount to coercion, and it 
should be placed completely outside the approved methods available to police 
when dealing with a mentally impaired and vulnerable individual.237  The cases 
analyzed above, however, as well as the general trend in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence toward reasonableness, make it clear that courts should not 
expect police to have the same level of expertise as a psychiatrist employing a 
battery of tests.  Therefore, the extent to which the police were aware or should 
have been aware of the impairment of the consenting individual will 
necessarily be the decisive factor.  As police training on these issues gradually 
improves,238 officers could reasonably be held to higher standards for 
recognizing individuals with mental impairments and responding to them 
appropriately. 
This approach, however, suffers from the fatal flaw already described: 
People with similar disabilities are afforded different treatment by the courts 
based almost entirely on the extent to which their impairment is perceivable by 
the police.  Presumably, there is little dispute that police should not take 
advantage of people they know or suspect are especially vulnerable.  But why 
should the seemingly average, yet equally impaired, suspect suffer?  In 
addition, a test that relies on what a police officer knew or should have known 
about a person’s mental condition is virtually impossible to administer.239  
Officers can easily and even plausibly assert that they had no knowledge or 
reason to know of the person’s mental impairments, turning the question into 
the kind of “swearing contest” that almost always favors the police.240  The 
 
 236. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (listing lack of advice as to the 
right to refuse consent, length of detention, repeated and prolonged nature of questioning, and 
physical punishment among others). 
 237. See Strauss, supra note 1, at 884-85. 
 238. Police departments, at least in major metropolitan areas, are receiving significantly more 
training on recognizing and dealing with mentally ill and impaired persons than they have in the 
past.  See generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH CONSENSUS PROJECT, COUNCIL OF 
STATE GOVERNMENTS, CONSENSUS PROJECT REPORT: POLICY STATEMENT 28: TRAINING FOR 
LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL (2002), available at http://consensusproject.org/topics/toc/ch-
VI/ps28-training-law-enforcement (last visited Mar. 18, 2004).  The goal of such training is to 
teach officers to both recognize the potential presence of mental illness in the field, to help 
officers understand how mental illness may have contributed to a situation, and to understand 
how to de-escalate that situation.  Id. 
 239. See White, supra note 116, at 2046. 
 240. See id.  Compounding the problem is that the vast majority of mentally retarded 
individuals suffer from only a mild or moderate disability, leading to a lack of identification of 
their impairment and overestimation of the ability to understand complex subjects.  Cloud et al., 
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only means of achieving judicial consistency and fair treatment of the mentally 
impaired is to exclude all evidence obtained pursuant to a consent to search 
given by a mentally impaired person. 
Two years prior to the Schneckloth decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals considered United States v. Elrod,241 a bank robbery case where the 
consent to search was given by the defendant’s accomplice, who had been 
declared incompetent to stand trial.242  Acting on a tip, the FBI picked up 
Elrod’s accomplice, Wright, at a bar in New Orleans.  Wright voluntarily 
accompanied the agents to their office and executed a “consent to search” form 
for the hotel room he and Elrod shared, where the agents found the money 
from the robbery.243  After their arrest, Wright was analyzed for competency to 
stand trial and ultimately was declared incompetent due to his long history of 
mental illness, including schizophrenia.244 
The court saw the issues of Wright’s competency to give consent and 
whether his consent was voluntary as “inextricably intertwined.”245  The court 
posed the question as “one of mental awareness so that the act of consent was 
the consensual act of one who knew what he was doing and had a reasonable 
appreciation of the nature and significance of his actions.”246  After finding that 
there was sufficient evidence to conclude that Wright was mentally 
incompetent when he signed the consent form, the court turned to the 
prosecution’s argument that it was unreasonable to require the police to make 
psychological determinations of suspects’ competency to consent.  The Court 
stated: 
No matter how genuine the belief of the officers is that the consenter is 
apparently of sound mind and deliberately acting, the search depending on his 
consent fails if it is judicially determined that he lacked mental capacity.  It is 
not that the actions of the officers were imprudent or unfounded.  It is that the 
key to validity—consent—is lacking for want of mental capacity, no matter 
how much concealed.247 
 
supra note 4, at 511.  The authors found that regardless of the level of disability, the mentally 
retarded subjects they interviewed understood neither the content of Miranda warnings nor the 
underlying rights.  Id. at 538. 
 241. United States v. Elrod, 441 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 242. Id. at 354. 
 243. Id. at 354.  The money was inside locked suitcases, to which Wright also supplied the 
key.  Id. 
 244. Id. at 355. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Elrod, 441 F.2d at 355. 
 247. Id. at 356. 
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Although there is at least implied support for the Elrod approach in 
Schneckloth itself,248 subsequent decisions such as Jimeno and Connelly might 
seem to cast serious doubt on the legal viability of this support.249 
The Connelly court, for example, concluded that a suspect’s mental 
condition, standing alone, could “never conclude the due process inquiry.”250  
However, the Connelly decision, despite its attempt to distinguish itself, runs 
directly counter to at least two older Supreme Court cases251 applying the 
voluntariness test to mentally ill or disabled individuals.252  “The Connelly 
opinion’s attempt to manufacture police misconduct in those cases and to 
further find that such ‘wrongdoing’ was the basis for those decisions therefore 
is, to say the least, less than candid.”253  Refusing to apply Connelly to 
consensual searches, then, would be less a departure from precedent than a 
return to it. 
The Supreme Court of Mississippi has suggested that it would adopt just 
such an approach if an appropriate case were to reach it.254  In dicta, the court 
said that to be valid, consent to search must be both voluntary and given by a 
person without diminished mental capacity.255  The defendant would have the 
burden of demonstrating lack of capacity, but once that burden is met, the 
presumption of involuntariness would become irrebuttable.256  This test, for all 
the virtues of its simplicity and its clear acknowledgment of the difficulties 
surrounding obtaining consent to search from a mentally impaired person, may 
be unlikely to be broadly adopted.  Mississippi has adopted a higher standard 
for voluntary consent, adopting the knowing waiver approach of Miranda and 
Justice Marshall’s Schneckloth dissent.257  Despite the controlling precedent of 
Schneckloth, however, it is clear that the due process voluntariness standard is 
 
 248. Metcalf v. Long, 615 F. Supp. 1108, 1116 n.10 (D. Del. 1985). 
 249. LAFAVE, supra note 37 (concluding that if the Schneckloth rule were “read through” 
Connelly, Elrod would have a contrary outcome).  For a contrasting view that “Connelly should 
not be read as altering the basic role of the due process test,” see WHITE, supra note 145, at 197-
99. 
 250. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165 (1986). 
 251. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307-08 (1963) (excluding a confession as 
involuntary where the defendant had been given a drug to aid narcotic withdrawal symptoms that 
also had truth-serum-like effects); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 205 (1960) (excluding as 
involuntary a confession obtained at a time when the defendant was judged to be insane). 
 252. See WHITE, supra note 145, at 202. 
 253. Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court’s Voluntariness 
Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 135 (1988). 
 254. Jones v. State, 607 So. 2d 23, 28 (Miss. 1991). 
 255. Id. 
 256. See id. 
 257. See id. at 28-29.  The United States Supreme Court, also in dicta, has suggested that 
consent to search given by a mentally impaired person would be invalid if given while in custody.  
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424-25 (1976). 
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as unworkable in the consent search context as it was when the Miranda Court 
criticized it in the confession context.258 
The Supreme Court’s recent reaffirmance of Miranda259 underscores the 
importance to the criminal justice process of having bright-line rules that are 
easily definable and applicable.  In Dickerson v. United States, the Court 
considered a constitutional challenge to a federal statute that purported to 
overrule the Miranda holding and restore the due process voluntariness 
standard as the sole test for determining the admissibility of confessions.260  
While the specific holding of the case was that Miranda was a constitutional 
rule that could not be superseded by a mere statute,261 Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for the majority, underscored that “the totality-of-the-circumstances 
test which [18 U.S.C.] § 3501 seeks to revive is more difficult . . . for courts to 
apply in a consistent manner.”262  Whether the test is applied to a confession or 
a consent to search, the problem of judicial inconsistency remains a troubling 
one, and one that could be ameliorated by the test proposed in this Note. 
There remains, of course, another objection to the proposed test; namely, 
that by excluding evidence obtained pursuant to the consent of a mentally 
impaired person, the test seemingly ignores what the Supreme Court has called 
the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule: its deterrent value.263  According 
to the deterrent rationale, if excluding evidence is unlikely to prevent future 
police misconduct, then there is no purpose served by the exclusion.264  In 
United States v. Leon, the Court “concluded that because the cost entailed in 
excluding relevant evidence outweighed any benefit, the exclusionary rule 
should not apply even though defendant’s fourth amendment rights were 
violated.”265 
To allow the deterrence rationale to dictate the application of the 
exclusionary rule in this way is to allow outcomes to dictate the content of the 
Constitution.  If the deterrence rationale is truly the only basis for excluding 
evidence, then “the upshot of the Court’s position is that unless exclusion will 
deter someone in an official capacity, there can be no due process violation no 
matter how unjust the result.”266  A rule that provides a more “coherent theory 
of justice”267 is one that excludes evidence because an individual’s 
characteristics render their consent involuntary in fact.  Police conduct, being 
 
 258. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461-62 (1966). 
 259. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). 
 260. Id. at 432-44. 
 261. Id. at 444. 
 262. Id. 
 263. See generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-21 (1984). 
 264. Id. at 918. 
 265. Benner, supra note 253, at 136. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 137. 
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irrelevant in the analysis under this rule, does not bring the deterrence rationale 
into play.268 
Society’s attitudes toward those with mental impairments is changing.269  
The Supreme Court has already recognized that “some characteristics of 
mental retardation undermine the strength of the procedural protections” 
embedded in the Constitution.270  When analyzing whether mentally impaired 
individuals have voluntarily consented to police searches of their homes or 
possessions, courts have given the issue cursory lip-service treatment, confused 
the standard with others that also relate to mental ability, or devised tests that 
lead to unsatisfying and discriminatory results.  Despite the costs, courts 
should widely adopt the approach of the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court 
of Mississippi and exclude evidence when they determine that mentally 
impaired individuals have not, in fact, voluntarily consented to the searches 
that produced it. 
BRIAN S. LOVE 
 
 
 268. As Chief Justice Warren Burger noted, the exclusionary rule “demonstrably has neither 
deterred deliberate violations of the Fourth Amendment nor decreased those errors in judgment 
that will inevitably occur” in the high-pressure atmosphere of police work.  Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 418 (1971) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting).  Chief Justice Burger heavily criticized the exclusionary rule, but he acknowledged 
that the alternatives were either inadequate or beyond the power of courts to provide.  Id. at 418-
22. 
 269. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-15 (2002). 
 270. Id. at 317. 
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